Saturday, September 1, 2007

Buddhism


Buddhism, a Rational Religion?

There is the view that all religions are the product of superstition. That is that all religions have their foundations in miracles and purport a creation myth which clearly goes against any intelligent understanding of history. This line of reasoning is argued using a fallacy of composition by assuming that certain features that are essential for Christianity have their counterpart in all of the other religions. This view is false, and it will be the purpose of this paper to defend a certain religion as having a basis in a very strict epistemology. That religion is Buddhism. I will show that it is very close to Transcendental Idealism, which is the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer. I will compare these to both Christianity and materialism, which I believe to be two very common metaphysics in the present society. The reality is the religion of Europe and the European peoples has been Christianity for almost two millennia, and since the time of the Enlightenment the materialist metaphysics of John Locke enjoys the status of being perceived as both philosophically sophisticated and not betraying common sense. In this paper I will critique both the Christian and materialist position as lacking the philosophical sophistication of Buddhism. I will critique Christianity by showing that some of its core tenets are superstitious, and thus disallows it from being a philosophical religion. I will critique materialism by showing that the epistemology is not as developed as it should be. I believe that this epistemology was thus developed throughout the history of Modern Philosophy through both the Rationalists and Empiricists, and receiving its culmination in Transcendental Idealism which will be shown to be similar to that in Buddhism, thus showing the philosophical sophistication of Buddhism.

The standard view of Christianity states that Jesus is the son of God, and that he died on the cross for our sins, and rose from the grave to overcome “death”. Thus by having faith in “Jesus rising from the grave”, we are “washed in his blood”, and expiated of sin. This original sin was caused by Adam disobeying God by eating from the Tree of Knowledge. Through this act, both sin and death entered the world, and is the reason for us experiencing death and being in danger of damnation. To put it very simply, we must believe in Jesus’ resurrection and the reason for that is Adam’s disobedience. Without Adam disobeying God, there would be no reason for Jesus’ death and resurrection; it would be an absurd event. The verses establishing the necessity of Jesus’ death and resurrection are 1st Corinthians 15:14, “And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain”(1), and 1st Corinthians 15:17, “And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins” (2). This states that the miracle event of Jesus’ death and resurrection is essential to Christianity. The verse elucidating the need that the Genesis story is factual, since the cause of sin was Adam is Romans 5:12, “Therefore, just as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death spread to all men, because all sinned” (3). The key phrase of this verse is “just as through one man sin entered into the world”. This one man is clearly Adam, so the Genesis story must be believed to be factual so that the resurrection of Jesus has a reason, without that it would be absurd. To reduce it to a more critical analysis, Christianity rests on a miracle event, and a mythological view of history that has no evidence to support that the events did happen. The epistemological problems associated with miracles we dealt with in the period of Modern Philosophy. Both Kant and Hume’s critique of miracles articulates that it is impossible to reason justly to believe that a miracle happened. It would be a great misunderstanding of Hume to assume that just because his skepticism attacks the concept of a necessary connection between events, for example if one billiard ball strikes another and that the other billiard ball moves it was the previous billiard ball that necessarily caused the other billiard ball to move, that we live in a universe where anything ridiculous can be believed. The skepticism of Hume does not in any way diminish from the firm and unalterable experiences of nature than we have had to be the foundation for the regularities that support the idea of laws of nature. It is the uniformity of experiences that give us these natural laws. The supposed justification of a miracle is that that of a testimony of witnesses. Here we have two contradictory sources of information, that of the firm and unalterable experience of nature versus the testimony of an individual or group of individuals. The argument of Hume against miracles is that a wise man proportions his believe to the evidence given, so when someone is making an outrageous claim that goes against our experience of the uniformity of nature, the evidence given must be so overwhelming that it surpasses the evidence given by the uniformity of nature. The question then becomes what is more reasonable to doubt, the laws of nature based upon uniformity of experience, or the testimony of witnesses. Since it is a common experience that people lie or are mistaken, we can always doubt the good sense, integrity, or education of the witnesses. We can also think of many other factors that are involved in human testimony that forces us to doubt whether that testimony is correct. There are no experiences that cause us to doubt the laws of nature since firm and unalterable experience has given us these laws if they are firm and unalterable experiences. This being said, the criteria that would overcome the problems of lies or mistakes from human testimony to make it more believable than the regularities of nature would be something like a large body of independent scientists who have no agenda, and are in a position where they have a lot to lose if they are caught lying, and then confirm the even. The supposed resurrection doesn’t even come close to this. The argument against miracles by Kant deals with the notions of possibility and impossibility. Miracles are logically possible, they are also theoretically possible, but they are practically impossible. Practical reason operates according to universal laws. For example, when constructing a scientific theory to explain the phenomena, I can only do so if the phenomena operates under universal laws. It would be impossible to test, falsify, or have any repeatability if scientific laws were not universal. Miracles are by definition seldom occurrences which are not part of the universal laws of nature, therefore they cannot be falsified, tested, and repeat ably tested. The key issue is that we cannot determine this on the knowledge of the object, it is theoretically possible, but only on the principles that are necessary for the use of our reason, which operates on universal laws, and therefore it is practically impossible. Since we are rational beings who are free based upon that rationality, our greatest freedom results in the ability to be rational and hold to these universal laws which is the basis for both our scientific and moral knowledge, any assault on that attacks our dignity. The interesting thing is that this individual, who operates according to universal laws, would be equivalent to who Kierkegaard states is in the ethical sphere. Kierkegaard realizing that the demands that Christianity puts on people is incompatible with a rational worldview, stated that the true Christian is the one who transcends the ethical sphere into the religious sphere through an absurd leap of faith. Also, the Genesis story has no evidence to support it as being true, and based upon our knowledge of history it is ridiculous. Christianity does have these superstitious elements as an essential feature, but it would be a great error to assume that of all religions.

The next critique I have is against materialism. The problem starts out as one of undetermination, which is having two contradictory theories that both explain the evidence given. All of our scientific data is based upon a spatiotemporal reality where objects in this reality are related to each other through the principle of causation, or structured through categories that quantify, qualify, relate, and apply modalities. Both materialism and a Buddhist, Vedantic or Transcendental Idealist metaphysics use this structuring. Therefore, they both explain all scientific data with equal certitude. The assertion of materialism is that the above articulation of reality is descriptive of the only substance, whereas the assertion of the Buddhist, Vedantic, or Transcendental Idealist metaphysics is that the above articulation of reality is not that of the absolute substance, but a manner of knowing this reality, a “veil of Maya” to speak. The difference is one of an ontological versus an epistemic condition. Materialism states this is an ontological condition by taking our experience and reducing it to primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities are those that are mathematical, extension in space, and motion of these extended substances. The secondary qualities are those of sounds, colors, textures, odors, and flavors. If I was to take all that constitutes my sense ideas, and assume that it was representing reality, I would rather naïve. The extreme subjectivity amongst sounds heard, colors perceived, textures felt, odors smelled, and flavors tasted would make any reflective person think about these actually being purely objective. The reality is that people will see differently if they are colorblind, people might taste sugar differently if they are sick shows that a heavy subjective element is found within these perceptions. The materialist then states that these qualities are caused by powers of the object on the subject, whereas the primary qualities that are mathematical accurately describe external reality. Therefore space as an extended substance reduced to the smallest possible particles is what is ultimately real. The Transcendental Idealist which the Buddhist or Advaita Vedantist is as well, states that just as the secondary qualities are subjective, so are the primary qualities. The key thing is that they are not arbitrarily subjective, but caused by necessary processes within the ultimate structure of reality resulting in how we must know empirical reality. The non-absolute nature of space, time, and atoms has been shown by Kant in two of his four antinomies, the other two dealing with causation and necessity and contingency. If the universe is infinite in time then up to any point in time an infinite sequence of events must have elapsed, since it is impossible that an infinite sequence can elapse, the universe must be finite in duration, but if the universe is finite in duration, then what was before the universe was an empty time in which all points in an empty time are the same, so there is no reason why time began when it did. There is a similar argument for space, and that is if space is infinite it would require an infinite successive synthesis of parts which could never be completed, and that if space is finite then what is beyond this space is an empty space which would make objects related not just in space, but to space, and make the universe related to this empty space which would be in relation to no object. The antinomy of atoms deals with the contradictory nature that when we take apart a substance, there are still smaller particles that make up that substance, so any process of taking apart results in particles, whereas it can be equally argued that this process can be done infinitely considering that space is infinitely divisible resulting in the impossibility of atoms. These arguments of the Transcendental Idealist state that the above conditions are not that of an absolute substance, but an epistemic condition on how we know reality, thus demolishing the foundation for materialism. I will next argue for a synthesis of Buddhism and Transcendental Idealism. The reason that I will not be doing this for Transcendental Idealism and Advaita Vedanta is because Advaita Vedanta starts from the speculative metaphysical principle of maya, whereas Buddhism’s method is more epistemologically oriented, in taking experience as the foundation for the system.

The Buddhist metaphysics is the paticca sammupada, or conditioned genesis, and this metaphysics is very compatible to that which is in Transcendental Idealism. I will show how many of these conditions have their parallel in the philosophy of Transcendental Idealism, and then argue for the additional conditions that Buddhism has. First, I will explain the paticca sammupada. The paticca-samupadda is an articulation of the second noble truth of samudaya, which is the origin of dukkha (1). The Buddha has called this doctrine “profound, hard to perceive, hard to understand, peaceful, elevated, not reducible to discursive thought, subtle, accessible only to the wise” (2). This doctrine has also been stated as being the premise for both the third noble truth of nirodha and the fourth noble truth of magga (3). Nirodha is the possibility of overcoming the state of existence caused by dukkha, and magga is the practical method to do so. The pattica-samupadda or “conditioned genesis” is a series of twelve conditioned states. These conditions are avijja (ignorance), sankhara (formation or predisposition), vinnana (consciousness), nama-rupa (name and form), sad-ayatana (sixfold sense sensation), phassa (contact), vedana (feeling), tanha (thirst), upadana (to embrace), bhava (becoming), jati (birth), and jaramarana (old age and death). I will start with the end of the paticca-samupadda, and then work myself back to the beginning, since I believe it is the beginning of the chain which is important for the point that I wish to argue.

The last conditions are those of jati and jaramarana; that is birth, old age, and death. These last two are quite self-evident, things are born into this world, then decay. The conditions previous to this will be seen as the a priori categories of experience that we have when we are born (5). The condition prior to birth which is tenth on the paticca-samupadda is that of bhava, which is literally translated as becoming (6). By stating becoming as the condition for birth and then decay, the Buddha is asserting a metaphysics where the world is one of flux and change, where everything is impermanent. The prior condition to that of bhava (becoming) is upadana, which is literally translated as “to embrace” (7). This condition is responsible for the associating of an I that is in relation to being attached to a non-I. The self is perceived as that which desires this, and then desires that, which then results in this is my self, that is my self. This is important since detachment is considered to be a very important concept in Eastern metaphysics. It is stated in the Dhammapada that through detachment, Indra became king of the gods(8). The condition priori to upadana is that of tanha, which is thirst in the metaphysical sense (9). This condition of existence states we are going to experience feelings that are pleasurable, painful, and indifferent. This will create in us a thirst for those pleasurable feelings, a thirst to go away from those painful feelings, and a thirst to go from the indifferent to the pleasurable feelings. At all times we are bombarded by sense impressions which cause a feeling in us, and then we thirst for things in this world based upon that feeling. This then leads us to the previous two conditions of phassa, and vedana. Phassa is translated as contact, whereas vedana is translated as feeling (10). Our immediate experience is one of sense impressions, which are sounds, colors, textures, odors, and flavors. This immediately causes us to associate a feeling in response to these impressions. This then leads us to the prior condition of sad-ayatana, or the six fold sex sensation by which we experience these contacts(11). Since our experiences are those of sounds, colors, textures, odors, and flavors, there must be something that allows for the experience of these impressions, and that is sight, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting. There is also the “sense” of mind that along with coordinating these impressions allow us to receive contacts from a more subtle source.

The important thing to note is the phenomenological certainty of this. It accurately describes our experience in this existence, the experience of birth and death, the flux of becoming, the embrace of existence that follows from the flux of becoming, the cravings we experience, the sense impressions we experience, the feelings associated with those impressions, and the senses that allow us to receive these impressions, including the “sense” of the mind that explains the ideas we have that do not originate from the other senses.

The previous condition on the nidana chain is nama-rupa, or that of name and form(12). The truth is that our knowledge of reality is mediated through our thought or our language. For Kant we know this empirical reality through twelve categories, and for Schopenhauer it is through the principle of sufficient reason. The name and form that we apply to experience does give us knowledge of objects, but it is also a limiting factor, as the antinomies earlier showed. Wittgenstein also had this insight, thinking that we could not know anything outside of our language, though for Kant and Schopenhauer it does give us knowledge of empirical reality, just not what is transcendentally real. The Buddha’s insight is closer to Kant and Schopenhauer since this point in the nidana chain is where the “vertical” meets with the “horizontal”, stating what is transcendentally ideal is also empirically real. The previous condition on the nidana chain is that of vinnana, or consciousness(13). This is defined as the I-sense that goes along with perception. It is similar to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception that there must be a unified consciousness to perceive a unity in space and time. The similarity with Transcendental Idealism is that this I-sense is not taken to be a mental substance as it is in Descartes, but the result of being conditioned. The previous condition in the nidana chain is Sankhara, which means formation or predisposition in regards to a particular aim(14). This states that we have certain character formations that will cause us to act in certain ways. This is also expressed in the philosophy of Schopenhauer where we are essentially directed by our specific character which is generated by the Will. I can look all over the world and see different types of being ranging from plants, animals, and humans, and see that a different “character” informs all of these objects. These “characters” are expressed in the more simple ones expressed in the stimuli of plants all the way to the most complex expressed by the specific character motivations of humans. This can be articulated very well using the metaphysical insights of Schopenhauer. If I reflect upon my nature, what I know is my will, and that will I apply to other beings in lesser or greater degree based upon their level of being. The immediate awareness of my own character allows me to ascribe a character to other objects, similar to the awareness of my own mind allowing me to posit other minds in similar beings. These conditions from nama-rupa to sankhara are known through a more reflective phenomenology based upon transcendental conditions. The awareness that I know reality through a rational structuring is one of the great insights of Transcendental Idealism and the Buddha. The awareness of the “I” as an experience necessary for perception but itself also conditioned is another insight of Transcendental Idealism and the Buddha. The awareness of our nature being expressed by the actions that are deep rooted in our character and will is a great insight of both Schopenhauer and the Buddha. This being said, there is one last condition which is in the metaphysics of the Buddha, and fits very nicely in the system of Transcendental Idealism.

The first condition in the paticca sammupada is that of avijja, or ignorance. It can also be described as unawareness, mania, or intoxication(15). Describing this as a form of mania sets up the conditions that will follow. It determines the type of existence that we lead on this samsaric plane. Also, describing it as a form of ignorance shows it as a privative state that must be overcome, hence the truths of nirodha and magga that the Buddha had. For all of the different beings that roam on this world, the reason for the difference in knowledge and actions results in greater and lesser degrees of ignorance and mania. The knowledge that we are limited in our intellect to know and limited in our ability to act presupposes an ignorance to explain that limitation in knowing and a mania in out limitation to act. This existential insight of the Buddha takes the previous knowledge of our character and then truly reflects on what it will be like to be in this world. This truly adds an existential dimension to what is the philosophy of Transcendental Idealism, giving it a sense of completion. From the theory of the absurdity in existence to the Superman, these theories also agree with the mania and unawareness that are at the root of our existence. This is also embodied in the angst that one feels when reflecting on our existence. This being said the doctrine of the Buddha is that of a solid metaphysics, not one of superstition based upon miracles and prophecies. It is also a metaphysics that is more epistemologically precise and more existentially insightful than that of materialism. Both the intense reflection on our knowing and being make Buddhism a sophisticated metaphysics that can rival other theories. Let me end with a quote on Buddhism by George Grimm, “The Buddha has not merely awakened to the supreme reality: he also presents his higher knowledge that is superior to that of "all gods and men" most clearly and free from all mythological disguise and mythical clothing. Here, however, it is given in so cogent a form that it presents itself as positively and self-evident to the person who is able to follow him. For this reason the Buddha does not demand any belief, but promises knowledge.(16)”

Notes

1) Evola, Julius. The Doctrine of Awakening. Inner Traditions (1995) p 57

2) Samyutta Nikaya 6.1

3) Evola, Julius. The Doctrine of Awakening. Inner Traditions (1995) p 58

4) Ibid p 59

5) Ibid p 68

6) Ibid p 68

7) Ibid p 67

8) Dhammapada verse 30

9) Evola, Julius. The Doctrine of Awakening. Inner Traditions (1995) p 66

10) Ibid p 66

11) Ibid p 67

12) Ibid p 62-66

13) Ibid p 62

14) Ibid p 61-62

15) Ibid p 59 – 61

16) http://www.buddhanet.net/budintel/belief/bnotdemb.htm